

TWENTY-FIRST REPORT OF THE  
U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION  
ON INFORMATION

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LETTER

FROM

THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION  
ON INFORMATION

TRANSMITTING

COPY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION,  
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 80-402



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## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION,  
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN,  
*Washington, D.C., March 4, 1965.*

Hon. JOHN W. McCORMACK,  
*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I transmit herewith a copy of the 21st Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, dated February 1966. This report is required by section 603 of Public Law 402, 80th Congress.

A copy of this report also is being sent to the Senate.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK STANTON, *Chairman.*

(Enclosure: 21st Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information.)

THE TWENTY-FIRST REPORT  
OF THE  
United States  
Advisory Commission  
On Information

★

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## *To The Congress of the United States*

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The U.S. Advisory Commission on Information submits its Twenty-first Report to Congress for the calendar year 1965, in accordance with Public Law 402 (PL 402).

On March 27, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson nominated Mr. Palmer Hoyt, Editor and Publisher of the Denver Post, to succeed Mr. Clark R. Mollenhoff as a member of the Commission.

On July 13, 1965 President Johnson nominated Mr. Leonard H. Marks to succeed Mr. Carl Rowan as the sixth Director of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA).

Senate confirmation of Mr. Hoyt occurred on April 21, 1965, and of Mr. Marks on July 21. Mr. Marks was sworn in on August 31 and became the new Director of USIA on September 1, 1965.

During 1965 the Commission held ten meetings, four in New York and six in Washington, D.C., including a meeting with Mr. Marks before he assumed his new office. The new Director has taken over with vigor and is instituting a series of long-needed management changes that should result in a more effective foreign information and cultural program. USIA action with respect to this Commission's previous recommendations is outlined in a letter from Mr. Marks to The Chairman of the Commission. This letter is included as an appendix to this Report.

In September, 1965, Dr. Stanton and Mr. Hoyt, members of this Commission, accompanied by Mr. Frank Starzel, former general manager of the Associated Press, visited South Viet-Nam. The purpose of the trip was to appraise the U.S. psychological effort in Viet-Nam, to explore the effectiveness of personnel con-



ducting this effort including the organizational structure in which they operated, and to offer suggestions for improvement.

During 1965 the three other members of the Commission also visited United States Information Service (USIS) posts abroad. Mrs. Dorothy B. Chandler visited USIS posts in London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Manila. Mr. Sigurd S. Larmon visited USIS in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Lagos, Accra, Cairo, and subsequently Caracas. Mr. M. S. Novik visited USIS posts in Rome, Milan, Amsterdam, The Hague, and Brussels.

No report to the Congress on the information program in 1965 can fail to record this country's gratitude to the vital, round-the-clock performance of the USIS mission in Viet-Nam, of both Americans and Vietnamese, who are engaged in conducting psychological warfare. To influence minds under the duress of battle is an almost impossible task. The observations of those members of the Commission who witnessed psychological operations in Saigon and in the provinces of Viet-Nam, attest to the dedication and energetic effort of our personnel.

## PREFACE

It is the belief of the Advisory Commission that too little emphasis is being given to the crucial need to gain understanding and respect for the United States, its purposes and policies, through ideological means.

This calls for meeting the emergencies that exist today in Viet-Nam and Thailand. It also demands that we reach students and future opinion makers in other areas of the world through long-range planning involving libraries, the teaching of English, personal contacts, and the effective use of all media of communication.

When the United States Information Agency was created in the years shortly after the end of World War II, few Americans had any idea of the long-term commitment that was implied in our responses to the Cold War challenge.

Even now, 20 years after the end of World War II, with American troops still in Germany and Japan, with American troops still in Korea almost 15 years after the fighting there, and with American forces deeply involved in Viet-Nam, some Americans still fail to see the implication.

To this Commission the implication is clear. America is committed to a long and difficult course which may determine whether we survive as a nation and as a people. Along that course we will be severely tested from time to time by force of arms. We will continue to be constantly under fire in an all-out ideological struggle. Both phases of the overall struggle will strain our nerves, our ingenuity, and our resources. There seems to be no acceptable alternative than to meet the challenge with our best efforts.

When the Commission looks at the United States expenditures on these two phases, military and ideological, in the



struggle against Communist imperialism in the post-World War II era, it becomes apparent that the American people have accepted the commitment to do their best in the military phase. It is not clear that they have accepted a similar commitment as to their ideological response.

Between 1948 and 1964, the American people spent \$785 billion for military purposes and less than one-three hundredths of that (\$2.5 billion) for the USIA's ideological efforts. The Commission is aware that figures alone never tell the whole story; that a dollar invested in one way may bring more productive results than many times the same amount spent in another way. But the difference between the figures cited here is too great to allow for such comfortable rationalization. The figures show, at the very least, that the United States has given far too little emphasis to the ideological phase of the struggle for survival.

The competition from the Soviet and Communist China is increasingly active. Recently, the Tri-continental Congress held in Cuba concluded by announcing the establishment of a center in Havana for the purpose of accelerating and aiding "national liberation" movements in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Such a center created to originate and disseminate Marxist-Leninist propaganda, and to coordinate violent and non-violent infiltration and insurgency, constitutes a long-range threat to the stability and security of nations on all three continents.

Where USIA is closing libraries, and in some cases lessening efforts for budgetary reasons, the opposition moves in.

If the American people are to meet this competition, and gain peace through understanding, provision must be made for the time, talent, manpower, forward planning, and the degree of financial effort that the task demands.

The Congressional report which led to the passage of PL 402, in 1948 advised against "penny-wise and pound-foolish approach" in appropriations. "All that we require", the Congressional report said, "is the courage and imagination . . . to



establish and implement a sound program of reliable information and respected cultural explanation abroad, which will be comparable in times of peace with the unprecedented initiative we Americans are always able to display in time of war."

## SUMMARY

This Twenty-first Report to Congress by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information examines what needs to be done in order to step up, improve, and strengthen the U.S. information and cultural relations program.

The present program is an outgrowth of the U.S. experience in World War II. Its objectives and scope were changed and broadened by the passage of Public Law 402 in 1948.

As an important arm of the U.S. Government in its conduct of the cold war, the responsibilities placed upon it and public expectations of its accomplishments have exceeded its fiscal resources. Its limited appropriations have been further restricted because of previous evidence of mismanagement, past public and Congressional suspicion of its personnel and programs, the assumption that foreign information is only a temporary necessity and experimental in character, embarrassing mistakes from trial and error programs, and the difficulty of demonstrating annual achievements and results.

The U.S. information and cultural programs, succeeded in reducing many misunderstandings of the United States in Europe. They played a prominent role in assisting European countries to resist Communist temptations and threats from within and from without their sovereign territory.

In the last five or six years, the Congress has insisted that the United States reduce its information and cultural activities in Europe. As a result, a large financial investment in libraries, bi-national centers, information centers and smaller posts which showed cumulative results was sacrificed, in order to meet the increased demands that sprang from rapidly changing and even revolutionary conditions in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

This Commission believes that the decision to reduce our efforts in Europe is a strategic error. The public outcry in Europe and in some American newspapers has interpreted this as U.S. psychological disengagement. At a time when post-war progress in Europe has been halted and set back by De Gaulle, it is necessary to be present and support those who have fought so valiantly and hitherto so successfully for the conditions which have produced a revived, prosperous, and more economically unified Europe.

In order for the United States to meet its responsibilities as a world power in information, education, and culture as it has done in defense and in the military and economic assistance programs, it must reexamine, step up, and strengthen its current effort. There is recent evidence that neglected and accumulated management problems in USIA are receiving attention. With more effective top management, USIA is in a better position today to face up to its ultimate purpose and to meet new challenges.

With population continuing to increase, the rise of a new generation and our adversaries continuing to undermine U.S. purposes and policies, it is more than ever necessary to seize every opportunity to reduce foreign misunderstanding of the United States.

To accomplish this objective the Commission recommends that:

- 1) USIA's purpose and role should cover both present and future objectives;
- 2) USIA should develop long-range plans. A ten year (1966-76) plan is recommended;
- 3) USIA should make more effective use of research in its plans, programs, budget, and evaluation;
- 4) USIA should improve the quality of its programs, products, and personnel.
- 5) USIA should strengthen, balance, and integrate more effectively its cultural and information programs;



- 6) USIA should reexamine its assumptions and review its programs, country by country, in order to expand useful ones and discard those that are marginal; USIA should review its list of priority countries for the purpose of determining areas of concentration and saturation and areas where minimum U.S. presence is sufficient.
- 7) USIA should search constantly for new techniques in communications from the private sector, especially from advertising, public relations, the public media of communication, and from universities.
- 8) USIA should continue to help create favorable atmospheres abroad for the understanding of U.S. foreign policies.
- 9) USIA should review and reconsider the decision to close libraries, bi-national centers and information centers in Europe.
- 10) USIA should seek a level of appropriations more commensurate with its responsibilities and more in proportion to the efforts of the U.S. military and of the U.S. economic and military assistance programs.

The Commission believes that in pursuing these ten tasks, the official government's effort in foreign communications can play a more determining role in developing respect for and confidence in the United States and in promoting greater international understanding.



**THE TWENTY-FIRST REPORT  
OF THE  
United States  
Advisory Commission  
on Information**

The U.S. information, educational and cultural program was a direct outgrowth of World War II. During the war the U.S. Government used all available information techniques and talents to influence the enemy, our allies, and neutral countries with varying degrees of success.

The legislation created to support the information program, stemmed from a widespread concern over the postwar spread of Communist propaganda activities in Western Europe and in other parts of the world. The present program dates from 1948 when Public Law 402 was passed.

From its inception the information program faced difficult problems in management and organization, policy and program, facilities and construction, personnel and evaluation, and the evolution of its role in the government's structure. Compounding these problems have been the difficulty of establishing an adequate financial and appropriations base and the domestic political controversies concerning its activities which have periodically raged in Congress and in the press. A succession of six directors in the last 12 years—each with a different idea of the mission, did not provide continuity and stability to the Agency's direction and leadership.

Improvement in the program's operation came slowly. Thanks to congressional investigations and hearings, public criticism, executive-level self-examination, and the periodic reports issued by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, the role of U.S. information became better defined, a sense of professionalism in the area of foreign communications began to emerge, purposes and objectives were clarified, confidence in its personnel and its methods grew gradually and in more recent days there are encouraging signs that management and administration are improving.

This has taken some 17 years of effort, of trial and error, of mixing and meeting short-range crises with long-range considerations.

During this period, the information and cultural relations program played an important role in:

- 1) European developments in which politically viable countries successfully withstood the threat of Soviet domination and in which the devastation of the war years was followed by a remarkable economic recovery;
- 2) the rehabilitation of conquered countries, e.g. Japan, Germany and Italy;
- 3) the Korean war;
- 4) the emergence and development of African states;
- 5) the Alliance For Progress for Latin America;
- 6) unmasking Communist lies and setting the record straight on Communist distortions of the intentions, policies and life of the American people;
- 7) helping wherever possible to create atmospheres more favorably disposed to the acceptance of U.S. foreign policy.

During this period the personnel in this program demonstrated their ability to render superb service in times of crises, e.g. Berlin, Suez, the Cuban confrontation, the Congo, the Sputnik challenge to U.S. space capabilities, and today in Viet-Nam.



Their efforts in non-crises remained far less spectacular and left much to be desired.

During this same period, the American presence abroad became symbolized by "USIS" (the United States Information Service). And this American presence was institutionalized by the numerous USIS libraries, information centers and bi-national centers most of which enjoyed popularity, admiration and use.

Today a USIA worldwide apparatus exists which is capable of reaching hundreds of millions of people throughout the world with a message, with ideas, with information.

### *The World Today in Capsule*

Several months ago, Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao stated in a major policy document that the whole of Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the "countryside" of the world which will surround the "cities" in Europe and North America and overwhelm them in revolutionary ferment.

This broad formulation of the state of our times by a leading Chinese Communist, schematic and over-simplified as it may be, is important and pertinent for two reasons:

First, it illustrates how the most militant Communist power in 1965 identifies the strategy and thrust of world developments and by implication its own role in these developments.

Second, it places in different perspective the goals and objectives of the United States. It illuminates strikingly what U.S. objectives, policies, programs and activities are up against.

### *Europe—"the Cities" of the World*

Lin Piao's formulation of world developments was only dimly perceived when Public Law 402 creating a U.S. Information and Education Service was passed in 1948.

At that time the major concern was Europe which lay devastated and chaotic after five years of war and thus vulnerable to the extension of Soviet power, cloaked by the machinations of internal Communist movements.

It was only after a long trip to Europe by a bipartisan joint Senate-House Committee and the publication of its report which reflected anxiety and concern over the specter of a Communist western Europe, that Public Law 402 was passed. The Congress was determined that the United States join the debate initiated by Communist propagandists in order to correct and reduce the amount of European misunderstanding of American purposes and American policy.

For almost a decade and a half the U.S. Information, Cultural and Educational Exchange Services played a role in European recovery and in the gradual reduction of European-American misunderstandings.

Throughout this time, the world witnessed the evolution of a nuclear stalemate between the Soviet Union and the United States. Simultaneously the non-military dimensions of the cold war grew.

Propaganda, cultural and educational exchanges, competition in foreign economic and military assistance programs, and subversion were first unleashed by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites and later by Communist China. Their purpose was *first* to undermine and reduce the wartime influence and prestige of the United States, and *second* to induce revolutionary activities against legitimate regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Success in the rehabilitation of Europe has recently persuaded some members of Congress that the need for a U.S. psychological arm could no longer be justified in that area. Success in arresting Communist revolution in Western Europe, it was believed, no longer required a continuous presentation of the American position. It was the opinion that it was not necessary for the United States to provide a service which the newly prosperous Europeans could provide for themselves.

Furthermore, with the new challenges in Africa, with new revolutionary developments in Asia and Latin America, it was felt that it was necessary to divert facilities, funds and per-



sonnel from Europe to these areas of greater demand and that American libraries be dismantled and discontinued.

The U.S. Information Agency arguments to the contrary were not persuasive. Many European posts and libraries in France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, symbols of a progressive and helpful United States were eliminated. Unfortunately these decisions were made while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance was in disarray and while much of the political-economic cooperation was being set back by the new policies and statements advocated and promulgated by Charles De Gaulle.

European misunderstandings of America in 1948 have been replaced by European misunderstandings of today. They are based on opposition to certain American foreign policies, the rash of racial disturbances and riots, fears of the American economic "invasion" of Europe and the traditional envy of the great power which in the case of the United States is identified as a country with a low level of culture and thought.

The deterioration of confidence in the United States represents a far more subtle threat than the blatant Communist propaganda of the forties and fifties.

This is understood by America's solid friends in Europe who have protested but to no avail at what they consider to be U.S. psychological disengagement and at a time when it is more than ever necessary to have open channels of communication from official Washington to the people of Western Europe.

Installations built up over a decade and a half which became accepted and respected institutions in Europe and which represented substantial financial investments by the American taxpayer over a period of years were abandoned in favor of unwise economies.

What is required of us in Europe is a steady concern and interest in this most important continent which, from every conceivable strategic viewpoint, is so much identified with and essential to U.S. vital interests.

It is imperative that European protests of these USIS reductions and the representations of the interested American press be heeded. The advantages that accrue to the U.S. national interest from USIS operations in Europe surpass the financial cost. The United States should reinstate its libraries in Europe on a permanent basis as a recognition of the importance of maintaining authoritative centers of reliable information about the United States, its purposes, policies and ways of life. Failure to do so in this Commission's view will not enable the United States to display the necessary degree of staying power that is indispensable to its own national interest, and to the eventual establishment of a stable Europe and a peaceful world.

*Africa, Latin America and Asia "the countryside" of the world*

It is in the "countryside" of the world that the United States has directed its greatest psychological thrust during the last five years. This is the battleground of the immediate future. These are the areas where the inhabitants are experiencing a "revolution of expectations."

These are the areas where with significant exceptions, conditions are relatively primitive, population is exploding, illiteracy is high, health care and sanitation are lacking, nationalism is rampant as nations are being created, languages are varied, and the level of civilization is far different from that of the "cities" of North America and Europe.

These are the areas where in many instances whole systems of education and communications are being installed for the first time. The challenge to communicate effectively and to persuade the newly literate, the poverty stricken and those so vulnerable to revolution is immense.

At the same time, these are the areas where the competitive coexistence philosophy of the Soviet Union's policies and those of the United States have in some countries deteriorated into insurgency and so-called "wars of national liberation."

First, in the Congo, then in Viet-Nam, and more recently in the Dominican Republic, violence has erupted as native and



foreign-inspired revolutionaries have combined in an effort to overthrow established regimes. In Viet-Nam USIA has actually assumed the responsibility for coordinating all psychological warfare activities. In many other countries, USIA functions under conditions which border on insurgency and violence.

And these are the areas, many of which were formerly dominated by European colonial powers, where distrust and misunderstanding of the United States are at their highest and where the need for skillful persuasion and education is great.

#### *Worldwide Responsibilities of USIA*

USIA shares the responsibilities of other U.S. agencies engaged in foreign relations. It is and should be recognized as a permanent psychological arm of the government. It shares these responsibilities because of the worldwide strategic, commercial and political interests of the United States. It shares them because these U.S. interests are being contested vigorously and will continue to be contested vigorously by the USSR and Communist China for the foreseeable future.

To adequately discharge these responsibilities requires resources, manpower, strategic planning and talent, that are not entirely appreciated either by those who plan its operations or by those who appropriate its funds.

It is in the light of these varied conditions that USIA faces throughout the world and in the perspective of Communist challenges to the "cities" and "countryside" of the world that the Commission offers the following recommendations.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *USIA's purpose and role should cover both present and future objectives.*

If, as President Johnson has said, "the search for peace is the assignment of the century," the role of USIA is to help create understanding without which the conditions of peace cannot prevail. This role is to help bridge modern gaps and ancient chasms that separate the peoples of the world culturally, politically and psychologically. Its sole resource is people and the instruments of communication that are available to these people.

This has been no small task. Although USIA alone cannot be expected to perform the miracle, what can be realistically expected of it will depend on whether the effort expended is adequate.

Up to the present time, the U.S. Government effort in this area has not been much beyond minimal, measured by what can be expected of it, compared to the percent of effort devoted to U.S. defense and to foreign economic and military assistance and contrasted with the magnitude of the effort invested by American business and industry in its public affairs. By all these criteria and standards the job of telling America's story to the world by the U.S. Government has been underprogrammed.

Public understanding abroad of the United States and its policies, confidence in them, respect and good will—these are the broad goals that USIA seeks to achieve. It is in this context that USIA also presents and publicizes U.S. foreign policy.

To accomplish these purposes USIA has used every form of communication technique and instrument.

U.S. foreign policy is and should be both short-range and long-range in character. Much of the USIA effort is directed to the daily tactical task of explaining U.S. foreign policy devel-



opments and pronouncements. The heaviest burden falls on press, radio and on the newsreels of television and motion pictures in Washington. The products primarily are fast news, features, photographs and film. Around the world USIA foreign service officers distribute the products of these media adapted to their particular foreign audience or initiate and produce them themselves. And in the cities of the world where USIS has personnel, efforts are made to explain and discuss with foreign journalists, broadcasters, editors and large groups and organizations, the meaning and purpose of U.S. foreign policy as it develops daily, weekly and over the year. As a result USIA like the rest of the government must perforce spend a great deal of its time in putting out brush fires which erupt all over the world. The essential purpose is to set the record straight daily about U.S. intentions and motivations and to minimize and refute distortions and misinterpretation.

It is also true that irrespective of how effectively this foreign information task is executed, the actions and statements by some foreign leaders or by some foreign media will not reflect appreciation of particular U.S. foreign policies. As a result USIA is frequently placed in the difficult position of having to defend particular U.S. foreign policies which may not be popular at the moment.

But foreign policy objectives are also long-range in character. And this includes not only political, commercial, and strategic objectives, but the projection of American culture, science, education, the arts—indeed the entire gamut of one of the world's most exciting and dynamic free societies.

Throughout the world there is a persistent and insatiable thirst for what the United States is doing in everything from space and science to agriculture and the arts. This curiosity about the United States needs to be satisfied in every effective way.

The role of USIA cannot be justified or demonstrated by its success or failure in the short-run. For a fuller appreciation of its capabilities and weaknesses, its efforts over a longer period of time should be analyzed and judged.

2. *USIA should develop long-range plans. A ten-year (1966-76) plan is recommended.*

If USIA is to succeed in its vital mission as defined by the President and as outlined by the Congressional Statute, and if its purpose is to be realized then long-range planning must become a continuing function. In addition to the inescapable necessity of moving from crisis to crisis, of meeting daily foreign policy problems, and of putting out short-run brush fires, there is a need to formulate longer range goals and objectives. But long-range plans should be reviewed annually, or more frequently in the light of developments, with changes made as necessary and the plans updated accordingly.

Long-range plans should be designed to meet accumulated psychological problems in Western Europe, the challenges and opportunities appearing on the vast continent of Africa, the horizons extended by the Alliance For Progress in Latin America, and the threats and dangers facing the free Asian countries around the perimeter of Communist China. The sharp increase in both Chinese Communist and Soviet propaganda activities directed at Africa, Asia, and Latin America are in support of "national liberation" movements in these continents. They constitute a formidable adversary. They are signs of things to come. And USIA must prepare now.

Such plans should also address themselves systematically to the principal problems that interfere with an accurate projection of the United States. They should analyze, tie-in and contribute to all organizations the factors that are involved in determining the attitudes of other peoples and nations toward us. For example, they should encompass programs and projects to

- 1—acquaint American tourists traveling abroad with the importance of their role as private representatives of the United States;
- 2—simplify the orientation and processing of visitors from abroad by working with customs and immigration;



- 3—inform certain private athletic groups and organizations that represent the United States in international competition on the need for their personnel to observe the proprieties of conduct and behavior more carefully while abroad;
- 4—work more closely with private organizations like the International Chamber of Commerce, the Committee on Economic Development, the AFL-CIO, certain service clubs and others in order to promote a sustained program of information in foreign areas;
- 5—emphasize especially the role of the United Nations (UN) and assist its delegates and representatives as well as the foreign correspondents assigned to the UN;
- 6—take steps to assess what the opposition is doing and then to meet and keep ahead of this competition in facilities, in manpower, in organization and in money;
- 7—focus especially on the young rising generation in the schools and universities, on the labor groups that are emerging, and on intellectuals who play such prominent parts in the newly developing nations of the world;

During the next ten years USIA will have an unusual opportunity to project a long-range plan. For it is coincidental with the continuing need for such planning that in 1976 this nation will commemorate the bicentennial of its birth. In 1976 the American Revolution will have endured for 200 years.

This Commission believes that it is not too early for USIA, as part of its long-range planning, to begin to formulate a ten year plan with a gradually unfolding timetable of programs and events to culminate in the celebration of 1976. For this anniversary will provide the U.S. Government and USIA in particular, with an unusual opportunity to present to the world the fruits of its continuing experiment.



Such a ten year plan should consist of:

a *timetable* organized around the question of where do we want to be ten years from now;

*objectives* so realistically stated, that research efforts can help evaluate the progress or lack of progress that is made;

*programs* designed in the light of gaps in information or distortions among foreign audiences;

*research* intimately and analytically tied into the formulation of objectives, carefully collected to justify the projection of programs, and selectively utilized to test and assess products and results.

When completed, the plan should receive bipartisan support in Congress; it should have the endorsement of the President; it should be submitted to this Commission; and it should be used by the Agency as a long-range frame of reference in estimating its annual budget, in presenting its requests for annual appropriations and as a part of a long-range plan of action.

One of the recommendations to the President that came out of the Conference on the International Cooperation Year (ICY) called for a decade of international cooperation. The plan for 1976 that emerges from USIA should dovetail wherever possible with whatever projections are made concerning cultural and educational programs.

The spirit of freedom, independence, and equality is contagious. It offers a rallying point for the common as well as uncommon man.

Within this framework of freedom, the United States has developed a vital, dynamic, pulsating society whose progress has been phenomenal.

The task of USIA is to devise imaginative means of conveying to foreign audiences, but *related to their own interests, experience and problems*:

the nature and strength of our political system of federalism;

the nature and strength of our economic system;  
the nature and continuing growth of our mass educational system;  
the progress of our science and technology;  
the unusual productivity and massive research developed in every major intellectual discipline;  
the developments in culture, art, music and drama;  
the nature of a society that has accommodated different religions, colors and nationalities from all over the world;  
the perennially youthful character and optimistic outlook of our civilization;  
the nature of a society that is constantly experimenting, criticizing and reevaluating itself—its progress, its problems, its goals, its failures, and its achievements.

This is an incomparable story, and the world should know it. Some of our unresolved social problems dealing with race, poverty, illiteracy, slums, housing, disease, crime and other evidence of both urban and rural blight should not conceal the solid granite blocks of constructive achievement. Nor should these problems become the headlines that overshadow the daily efforts made by private and public groups to find solutions to problems and resolutions of conflicts.

The 20th century has become the century of instantaneous worldwide communication. The jet plane and the communications satellites like *Early Bird* and *Telstar* are tangible symbols of a new age. A USIA ten year plan should confront head-on and grasp the challenges and opportunities offered by these new technical marvels. For as people get closer, the impact of ideas and ideologies becomes greater. The purpose of USIA's ten-year plan is to help make this impact constructive and peaceful, by using these new, modern instruments of instantaneous worldwide communication for the presentation and exchange of views on matters of common concern to the peoples of the world.



3. *USIA should use more research in its plans, programs, budget and evaluation.*

Long-range planning cannot be formulated in a vacuum or on mere speculation and hunch. *It must be based on adequate research.*

Changing and influencing attitudes is one of the most difficult tasks that men attempt to perform.

This is the avowed purpose of the U.S. foreign information and cultural programs. The development of mutual understanding, of international cooperation and of respect and confidence in U.S. policies and objectives cannot be accomplished quickly, sporadically or everlastingly. When achieved it must be nurtured and sustained. And it must be continuous.

This Commission has long urged that USIA employ wherever possible modern research methods in order to ascertain when and where it has succeeded or failed, and how it can influence attitudes more effectively.

Unlike most private practitioners in foreign communications, USIA managers are not disposed to organize and develop their programs and their budgets around facts as established by research. Although the process of international political communication is complex, there appears to be little desire to utilize the facts that research has made available. The use of research has been seriously neglected in USIA to the detriment of the program.

With USIA facing complex and difficult situations in various areas of the world, not only area programs but specific country programs must be adapted to the conditions that exist. Competition varies in type and intensity—that which exists on a local level and that which emanates from the Soviet Union and Communist China.

In private communications industry, the basis for successful programming is careful and thorough research. This applies equally to the USIA and its operations—anywhere and everywhere. One cannot substitute guesswork for the facts and be on target.



The Commission recommends that the Agency prepare its budget and formulate its programs and projects in the light of knowledge supplied by research.

The Commission recommends that managers of USIA strategy and tactics increase their use of research and its results. If the program is to be improved, those who direct it must welcome the kind of information that reliable research can provide. Research must be used for planning purposes, for program development, for evaluation of particular activities and products, and for budgetary justifications. The USIA will not be able to move ahead and engender continuing congressional confidence without building up hard data in support of a large part of its program. The Commission believes this can be done. All that stands in its way are a defensive posture, the need for a greater proportion of funds devoted to research, and the determination to use the results. How else can one know whether the Agency's activities are having impact, short-range or long-range?

*4. USIA should improve the quality of its programs, products, and personnel.*

This Commission and its predecessors have urged USIA to improve the quality of its personnel, its products, its programs, and its facilities. This must also be a continuous and long-range objective.

Progress has been observed in the modernization and improvement of radio and television facilities. The reproduction plants in Beirut and Manila are well-equipped. Libraries, information centers, and bi-national centers should be uniformly attractive, well designed, well equipped, and well located. The managers of the media in Washington and Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) abroad must strive to attain the high standards reached by the technical facilities and equipment of domestic American communications industries.

The primary task of USIA is not only to perfect its apparatus and facilities, but more important to improve and raise the quality of the message and ideas that are transmitted. Fewer and better products in radio, press, publications, motion pictures,

television and books should be its goal. Quality products, perhaps more costly initially, are more effective in the long run. Their effects will last.

People and ideas are USIA's principal currency. Both should measure up to the long-range struggle that lies ahead. Both should be of the highest quality.

Men and women who seek and accept a career in U.S. foreign communications (information, culture or education) should be assured of an honorable one. They should not only be well educated generally, but well trained in the art and science of foreign communication. They should receive considerate treatment not only when they are in their twenties and thirties but also when they become forty, fifty, and sixty. Career development should become more than a euphemism. Officers should be treated as human beings and not merely as "bodies" that are being matched against available "slots". It is important that officers maintain their sense of mission, drive and enthusiasm in one of the most challenging and vital of Government professions. This is not possible unless personnel policies are progressive, constructive, and humane.

Of particular importance to the USIA mission is the need for its foreign service officers to have adequate training in the language of the country to which they are assigned. Although some progress has been made over the years, language training remains one of the weaker spots in the Agency's personnel system. To communicate effectively requires not only training in communication techniques, but knowledge of the language, traditions, and psychology of the population. The Commission recommends that USIA require effective language proficiency from its officers and provide them with time and facilities for adequate training.

Next in importance to the men and women who represent the United States abroad, are the ideas which they should share, create, develop and communicate to foreign audiences. There is a continuous need to reexamine USIA's premises and assump-



tions that underlie our programs, policies, and operations. There is a need to test critically and continually old and new programs, media products, techniques and methods of communication. There is a need to come to grips with the challenges and criticisms offered by foreign intellectuals, students, and young people. How can the U.S. establish constructive dialogues with those who oppose or misunderstand U.S. policies? What new means can be employed to depict the magnitude and depth of unparalleled progress and development in the United States? If there is a worldwide election contest between the free countries of the world and communism, as President Johnson once said, how can we gain adherents to freedom's side in the continuing worldwide debate? Have we utilized the brainpower of private specialists in labor, business, academic life, agriculture, and the professions who know well the fears and aspirations of the people of Europe (West and East), Africa, Latin America, and Asia and how to appeal to them? How can we work more effectively with the womanpower of the world whose emergence is one of the predominant characteristics of the awakening world?

Each USIA employee should be encouraged to offer his ideas on these and related matters. Creative ideas are as important as suggestions for increasing efficiency and economy and for improving operations. There is need for more concentrated consideration of them by top management as well as the employees of USIA. For without them USIA can become all form without substance, all apparatus without content, all technique without communication, all activity without achievement.

It might not be remiss for USIA to schedule sessions for its employees in which the major ideas of the contemporary world are considered by experts with a view towards improving the policies, plans, and programs of USIA. This could enhance the quality of USIA's radio and television, of its press and pamphlets, of books and features, of its design and graphics, of approaches and methods, of techniques, of emphasis and of its campaigns.



5. *USIA should strengthen, and integrate more effectively its cultural and information programs.*

This Commission believes that the long-range capability and resources for developing information, education, and cultural programs abroad should be strengthened. The Commission also believes that there is a need to define more adequately the activities that are sponsored by these programs.

The cultural and educational activities undertaken by USIA should be related to long-range foreign policy objectives. Any other criterion for spending the taxpayer's dollar cannot be justified. There is evidence that a cumulative, steady effort has produced results. This is true of libraries, certain exhibits, books, and cultural and educational exchanges.

Information activities and programs in support of specific foreign policies or as aids to the United States in explaining its position and role in crises situations will carry higher priority. They should not supplant the rich array of American cultural products and programs. It is necessary to disseminate information about American books, art, music, education, the English language, American history, etc. For misunderstanding and ignorance in this area is as harmful as a misunderstanding of a particular foreign policy. Such knowledge of America may prove to be more useful to the understanding and acceptance of American foreign policy than an interpretation of current news or events. In some areas where political hostility to the United States may be temporarily high, the cultural arm can continue to perform a helpful and healing function.

Further, the information and cultural activities should not be separated from one another as if they were contagious and required separate aseptic rooms. They should be coordinated and where appropriate, blended together by PAO's and CAO's (Cultural Affairs Officers) who are sufficiently sensitive to appreciate the potential power of both of these instruments of human communication in the development of international understanding.

It is unfortunate that so many of the excellent USIA sponsored cultural and educational activities that range from English teaching to seminars and book production are not well known to leaders of American education and culture. For example, a high degree of excellence has been achieved by the Agency's publications entitled "Problems of Communism," and "Legacy of a President", the Voice of America's Forum Program, such exhibits as the ones on American Architecture and Graphics, the catalog of Modern American Music, the contents of Amerika Magazines that are sent to the USSR and Poland, certain motion pictures and other products. In addition, the American cultural and educational scene has been covered and presented continuously by USIA for many years. Although funds have not been plentiful in this area, the results have frequently been impressive. More can be done and the quality of its personnel and products should be constantly improved. It is important to acknowledge however, that a solid start has been made. Careful building and development in the future not disruption and proliferation are the answers.

The Commission believes that the developing programs in culture, education and information should be more closely integrated and coordinated in Washington and especially in U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. Tendencies toward proliferation such as the inclusion of new education, art, music and cultural attachés, each reporting to the Ambassador, lead to uncoordinated and disorganized effort or to an unworkable span of supervision. Suggestions, regardless of how well motivated, that the cultural affairs officer be separated from the public affairs officer should not be heeded. It will set back the improvements made during the past fifteen years. For the success or failure of these programs lies not only in their inherent quality or substance, but in their management. The Commission believes that both are necessary.



6. *USIA should reexamine its assumptions and review its programs, country by country, in order to expand useful ones and discard those that are marginal; USIA should also review its list of priority countries for the purpose of determining areas of concentration and saturation and areas where minimum U.S. presence is sufficient.*

Assumptions about the role and function of USIS in every country should be reexamined in order to determine how much can be realistically accomplished. Since what is expected from the USIS program ranges from the dissemination of accurate information to the coordination of psychological warfare activities, these assumptions must be precisely delineated and related to specific country objectives. The same techniques, methods and channels which have been in use since 1948 should be examined in order to determine their current applicability. Are there new ones which should be added and old ones dropped? Each country mission should realistically review its objectives in this light. The Commission has been informed that the Director has instructed that this be done.

Priorities in programs and in country efforts are also necessary. There is a need to institute country by country program reviews in order to eliminate marginal activities, to replace outmoded techniques with modern, more effective ones, and to determine which media are necessary and important and which can be eliminated from a particular post.

The USIA should also determine where it wishes to concentrate its resources—personnel, money, and facilities—in order to achieve its goals. It should give consideration if necessary to the possibility of saturation programming for maximum effect. It should take advantage of areas where our present advantage may not continue forever and where present-day hospitality and appreciation of the United States is high. It should be frank in assessing where certain objectives can be achieved only if a large increase in funds is made available. It should identify those few countries which occupy the highest strategic



priority and provide them with adequate resources and our finest talent.

USIA should maintain wherever possible in friendly, neutral or hostile countries a chain of permanent institutions which, as library, information center or bi-national center, will serve as a symbol of the U.S. presence and as an authoritative repository of American materials. The United States must recognize that ancient friendships must be preserved and that American interests must be propagated even among, especially among, her friends.

7. *USIA should search constantly for new techniques in communication from the private sector, especially from advertising, public relations, the public media of communication and from the universities.*

"New" and "imaginative" techniques of communication should be sought constantly by operating officials. Top management must display sustained interest in searching for them and not permit the operation to become routine and non-productive. The views of American as well as foreign specialists in communication should be solicited. This can be done in a flexible and ad hoc manner. There is also need, however, for the Agency to lodge this responsibility in some central place, perhaps with the long-range planning function, which is presently dormant, or with the Office of Private Cooperation. Private communications research companies with advertising and public relations experience in foreign countries, the public media of communications and the universities are good sources of ideas and suggestions. USIA must explore and utilize more aggressively the most modern methods of influencing people by means of communications.

8. *USIA should continue to help create favorable atmospheres abroad for the understanding of U.S. foreign policies.*

USIA has a special role in creating an atmosphere for a better understanding of the United States and its foreign policies.

In certain instances it helps to establish a receptive backdrop for important diplomatic negotiations.

This is a traditional function for an information program. Communicating with those who direct and operate in the foreign media is an indispensable activity. USIA should be in a position to provide them with accurate and official information about the policies and intentions of the United States.

9. *USIA should review and reconsider the decision to close libraries, bi-national centers and information centers in Europe.*

During 1965 there have been continuing reductions of European posts and libraries in strategic places.

Five years ago the U.S. Government operated fifty-two libraries or information centers and thirteen reading rooms in Western Europe. Today there are twenty-two libraries and one reading room. The Commission believes that this drastic reduction has been unwise and uneconomic.

The libraries and information centers contain representative collections of American books, pamphlets, and periodicals. Some serve as centers for seminars, discussion groups, and lectures concerning the United States and its relations with other countries. They display exhibits, sponsor dramatic, musical and artistic events and become favorite meeting places for many who are interested in the United States. Their facilities are used by journalists, educators, workers, government officials, and parliamentarians. They are reference sources for students, both nationals and those from foreign lands.

The libraries and information centers were designed to create respect and understanding for the United States, its people, its principles and ideals. The effect is very often long-range, starting with students who eventually will be the political and business leaders of their countries.

The Commission recommends that the decision to close European libraries and information centers be reviewed and reconsidered.



10. *USIA should seek a level of appropriations more commensurate with its responsibilities and more in proportion to the efforts of the U.S. military and of the U.S. economic and military assistance programs.*

If the United States is to receive the respect and confidence which it seeks, it must be guided by policies and deeds that are deserving of a great power. In some instances, however, perfectly deserving deeds and policies may not be so recognized and acknowledged by all countries. To make sure that they are well presented and not distorted in any circumstances, and to carry the U.S. burden in the propaganda war of this century with Communist doctrine is the special responsibility of USIA.

In discharging these responsibilities the Agency is at once engaged in information, in education, in persuasion, in cultural presentations and activities, in preinsurgency and counterinsurgency operations and even in actual psychological warfare depending on the particular country in which it operates. To perform adequately, it must attract, train and retain people who are specialists in communicating reliable information about the United States to foreign audiences.

But, above all, it will require a more adequate fiscal base. Such a base can only be calculated, justified, and obtained if Agency objectives are realistically and reasonably formulated, if the techniques and methods are scientific and modern, and if information and cultural activities and programs, whenever feasible, are properly researched before they are produced, or at least after they have been released in order that their degree of impact and effectiveness may be judged.

It is difficult enough to communicate effectively with a domestic audience whose culture and language are similar for the most part. And huge sums of funds are involved. It is infinitely more complex and difficult to do so in the foreign milieu and atmosphere of over one hundred different countries. If the United States Government is to pay more than lip service to



what is expected of the U.S. Information Agency, it must begin to provide it with more realistic, financial support.

Compared with funds spent by private enterprise for similar public relations and information operations, the effort of the United States is miniscule. At the same time what is expected of this program is overdrawn and unrealistic. And compared to the U.S. military and economic aid, the effort is out of proportion.

The first words of the first Report to Congress issued in 1949 by the first members appointed to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information considered this matter.

"1. Is this program important?" the Commission asked.

"Yes; more than the Commission thought when the Smith-Mundt Act was passed.

"2. Is it effective? Yes, as far as it goes.

"3. Is it adequate? No.

"4. What can be done to improve it?"

On budget the Commission said, "a realistic approach requires that we provide a budget better balanced between the three-pronged program of military, economic, and information policy. A budget which contemplates \$15 billion for military, \$5 billion for economic and only \$36 million for information and education service does not provide an effective tool for cleaning out the Augean stables of international confusion and misunderstanding."

Nineteen additional Commission Reports to Congress and sixteen years later, these words remain true. For during this interval—

the Defense expenditures between 1948–64 were \$785 billion;

the AID expenditures between 1946–64 were \$99 billion;

the USIA-State expenditures for information, education, and culture between 1948–65 were \$2½ billion;

At the same time, the information and cultural programs have had some successes and failures, some accumulated experi-

ence, trained professionalism and improved facilities. Seldom during this period, have they been provided with sufficient resources in any country which would have permitted more than token performance.

In a recent article in Reader's Digest, former President Eisenhower in reflecting on "America's Place in the World," expressed his concern and appreciation for the need to achieve greater international understanding.

"The hard truth," he said, "is that this task of communication is so great that, in the main, it must be done by the federal government. I think we must decide that if we are going to win the cold war, we must spend whatever is necessary on this job—a half billion or even a billion a year if it takes that much. If we must, let us take it out of the defense budget or the space effort or some other program. Surely, in a national budget of over 100 billion dollars, we can find the needed money."

Congressional reductions in requested funds for reasons of mismanagement and inefficiency have been legitimate and valid. Cuts in appropriations in order to impose on the Executive Branch of government changes in policy such as the gradual psychological disengagement in Europe because of some congressional dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy, with foreign aid, or with the policies and attitudes of particular foreign countries can only produce handicaps to the mission of USIA.

Requests for increased appropriations need to be planned and justified by criteria and evidence which demonstrate the progress and effectiveness of the operation in particular countries. To accomplish this objective, there should be fewer and more realistic objectives set for USIA and there should be a major increase in the budget which is set aside for research in order to help produce this evidence.

### CONCLUSION

The Commission believes that between 1948 when Public Law 402 was passed and the present, the U.S. Government constructed a worldwide apparatus capable of communicating



messages to the peoples of the world in a variety of media. During this period the responsible agencies, including USIA from 1953 to the present, have had to overcome serious problems of management, of recruiting and training qualified personnel, defining and clarifying objectives and missions, developing a worldwide foreign service with its logistics, constructing and developing technical facilities, establishing the necessary fiscal and administrative controls, and seeking adequate appropriations.

As a result, the United States has begun to compete in the ideological arena with growing strength to the point where both the Soviets and the Chinese Communists have expressed pain at USIA's surprising strength and persistence.

The Commission believes that in order to meet the long-range challenge of hostile propaganda in every continent of the world where the United States has strategic interests, the USIA must be further strengthened.

The next ten years will provide USIA with a unique opportunity, as part of its long-range plans to project to the world the past and present accomplishments of the United States as well as its future intentions.

The Commission believes that to tell America's story to the world more effectively, and to combat those who are intent on distorting and subverting this story, USIA will require more substantial financing than it has received to date.


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
FRANK STANTON  
*Chairman*




Mrs. DOROTHY CHANDLER



SIGURD S. LARMON



PALMER HOYT



M. S. NOVIK

FEBRUARY 7, 1966



## APPENDIX

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY,  
*Washington, D.C., December 1, 1965.*

DEAR FRANK: I want to report to you on steps that I have taken during the first three months of my term of office as Director of the USIA, with particular reference to recommendations made by your Commission in its Twentieth Report to Congress and the President.

In that report you made certain specific recommendations which will be considered individually below:

1. *To improve Internal Management, Communication and Coordination*

To accomplish this objective I have utilized outside specialists in administrative management, news operation and radio broadcasting. As a result substantial changes will be made shortly in the operation of the Voice of America, the press and wireless service and the Office of Administration. In addition, I have previously announced the consolidation of the motion picture and television services, which merger became effective today.

In addition, I have enlarged the functions and responsibilities of my Executive Assistant so that he has a greater responsibility in the field of management. I believe that these steps carry out the spirit if not the letter of your recommendation.

2. *To Reduce the Number of USIA Buildings in Washington from Eleven to One*

I have had several meetings with the General Service Administrator, Lawson B. Knott, in which I pointed out the

DR. FRANK STANTON, *Chairman,*  
*U.S. Advisory Commission.*

difficulties inherent in multiple building locations. We are handicapped in our efforts to obtain a single building because of the logical suggestion that the VOA retain its location in the Health, Education and Welfare building and that other units move there when HEW abandons the building. However, it is unlikely that any immediate abandonment will take place and, during the interim, make-shift arrangements are suggested. I do not subscribe to this recommendation and will continue my efforts to remove some of the obstacles which we currently face in our housing of the Agency staff.

### *3. To Improve and Strengthen Long-Range Planning*

I concur fully with the recommendation and have named Wilson Dizard as a long-range planning officer in the Office of Policy. In addition, I intend to remove IOP from operational functions and direct their energies and talents towards planning.

### *4. Cultural and Exchange Program Activities*

a. I have given considerable thought to the role of the Cultural Affairs Officer, and have conferred with the newly-appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs, Mr. Charles Frankel. In addition we have jointly participated in a Task Force which will recommend an expansion of U.S. efforts abroad in the field of education. As a result of that study, I am hopeful that there can be a clarification of the role of the CAO, and a clearer delineation of the respective fields of interest between the various agencies interested in cultural activities.

b. There have also been discussions to coordinate and improve government programs for orienting and training foreign journalists visiting the U.S. A more definitive program toward this end will be proposed at a later date by USIA.

c. I have made the categorical statement that there will be no further reduction of libraries in Western Europe and that I will advocate the strengthening of our program in this area. I have previously explained to each of you orally the circumstances which led to the consolidation of the libraries services in



London, Paris and the reduction in Germany of the number of America Haus installations.

d. In order to restore the balance of the Agency's cultural program activity,

1. I have recommended the creation of the post of "Cultural Minister" in the leading capitals of the world. Preliminary discussions have been held with the Department of State and eminent scholars on the subject. These men have been invited to suggest candidates for this position. This recommendation has met with the whole-hearted approval of the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary for Cultural Affairs. Recruiting of candidates for this post will start shortly.

2. I am endeavoring to secure an outstanding scholar as my cultural advisor with the authority to supervise the Agency program in the field of books, libraries, teaching of English programs and related cultural activities.

*5. To Assume Responsibility for Planning and Executing the President's Trade Fair Exhibition Program*

We have proposed to the Department of Commerce a termination of the existing relationship with the Agency on trade fair programs. Our proposal is that the Department of Commerce be responsible for all trade fairs devoted to the sale of goods and services and that the USIA undertake and sponsor those trade fairs which are primarily for information and cultural purposes.

*6. To Seek Outside Evaluation of USIA Print and Radio Programs*

As previously reported I have used outside consultants to evaluate our press and radio activities. Mr. Frank Starzel, formerly General Manager of the Associated Press, has made a detailed study of the press and news operations. Mr. Peter Straus, owner of several radio stations, has agreed to undertake a study of the VOA program through Latin America with particular reference to youth groups.



*7. To Expand the Research Program and To Use Its Results More Effectively*

I have emphasized the importance of research activities and have instructed all area and media directors to work closely with the Office of Research and Reference Service.

*8. To Consider the Need to Consolidate Into One Agency of Government the Related But Widely Scattered Programs in Information, Education, and Culture*

No action has been taken on this recommendation.

*9. To Seek the Advice and Guidance of Local Latin American Practitioners of Mass Communications in Presenting the Alliance for Progress to Latin America*

I have met with the Public Affairs Committee of the Council of Latin America to discuss a cooperative arrangement with the leading U.S. companies engaged in international trade in this area. Steps have been taken to carry out a program of mutual benefit. In addition, I am hopeful that a closer relationship can be created with the Committee for Economic Development, the International Chamber of Commerce and leading labor groups. With reference to the latter, I have met with representatives of the AFL-CIO and recommended their participation and advice in this effort.

*10. To Confine USIA's Domestic Publications to a Minimum and Limit the Distribution of Its Media Products in the U.S. in Accordance with the Intentions of Congress*

I have issued a directive requiring my approval for all speaking engagements. As a result there has been a drastic reduction in the number of speeches made by employees.

I intend to restrict my speaking efforts to national groups engaged in the foreign policy field, and significant groups relating to press, broadcasting, books and other media. During the first 90 days, I have made three speeches as follows:

- a. To affiliates of the Columbia Broadcasting System.
- b. American Women in Radio and Television.
- c. Broadcast Promotion Association.


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At this time I wish to formally express my appreciation for the assistance which individual members of the Commission have given me and the collective encouragement which I have received from you.

I look forward to a meeting after the first of the year at which time I would like to present significant policy problems, budgetary questions and related matters.

If there are any questions regarding any of the steps which I have taken, I shall be glad to amplify this report.

Sincerely,



LEONARD H. MARKS

cc. Members of the Advisory Commission